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The Philosophical Act of Seeing With One’s Own 
Eyes: The Si lent  Fi lms o f  Stan Brakhage   
 
 
James M. Magrini 
College of Dupage 
 
 
In “Against Interpretation” Susan Sontag warns of the dangers associated with critical 
interpretations of art that work off the mistaken notion that art is reducible to an accurate 
interpretation, if “certain codes, certain ‘rules’ of interpretation” are applied and followed. Herein, I 
seek to revisit the filmic art of Stan Brakhage through the lens of philosophy in a way that avoids 
this tendency toward reification in critique, acknowledging at the outset that the depth and 
complexity of Brakhage’s work makes it impossible to even approach anything resembling a correct 
interpretation, for the capacity for these films to mean lies beyond the grasp of even the most deft 
and careful critic. What I am offering the reader is a constellation of interpretive gestures gathered 
around the central theme of philosophy: I intimate several possible ways, among a multitude of 
ways, that these films might express their truth. Sontag states that in most interpretations of art, the 
intellect takes revenge on art, in the attempt to do the unthinkable, namely, render great art 
“manageable,” because as she rightly attests, great works of art hold the power to “make us 
nervous.” This, I propose, is exactly what Brakhage’s films do - they shake us from our 
commonplace ways of seeing, understanding, and discoursing about the world, and accomplish this 
is a philosophical manner. His films, I argue, work toward the recovery of the bodily dimension of 
thought and return us to the original moments, liminal events, that mark out human “becoming” as 
we make the passage from the abyss, the void of absolute Being to a formal sense of conscious self-
awareness. Brakhage, unlike any other filmmaker, captures and re-presents the precarious nature 
and uncertainty of such acts defining human subjectivity, haunted as they are by the looming, 
foreboding presence of death, and does so, in great part, through the formal and stylistic choices he 
makes as a filmmaker and artist.  
 
1. On the Way to Philosophy Through Film 
 
Beyt Gault suggests that we celebrate great works of art “for their profundity, their insight into the 
human condition, for how they make us see the world anew.” The qualities of great art that Gault 
identifies are epitomized in Brakhage’s work, which is, as I show, from the beginning related to and 
inseparable from a philosophical attitude toward existence, because his films emerge out of an 
authentic “existential” mode of attunement, a mind-set wherein the potential for human 
transcendence is framed and filmed within its intractable relationship to death, the most extreme 
possibility of non-existence. Brakhage is not only viewing existence in a philosophical manner, 
beyond this, he is engaging in philosophical inquiry in a fundamental way through the medium of 
film. The films arise from and respond to what Karl Jaspers views as the ultimate source (arche) of 
philosophy, namely, “the will to authentic communication,” which embraces “wonder leading to 
knowledge, doubt leading to certainty, forsakenness leading to the self.” This amounts to the 
philosophical struggle to arrive at a sense of metaphysical coherence and existential familiarity, a 
belonging in the world with others. This foregoing claim about the relationship between philosophy 
and Brakhage’s filmic art is not unique to this analysis, for my authentic thinking on this issue was 
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inspired by Fred Camper, who writes that while “the at-the-edge quality of his work may have been 
born out of his personal psychology, it ultimately becomes, particularly in his major films, a 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of existence.”  
Brakhage draws inspiration for his work in a manner that weaves philosophy and art 
together in a seamless relationship, in that he questions and contemplates existence with the acuity 
and sensitivity of an artist, attempting to come to some sort of philosophical understanding of the 
situation, and then attempts to recreate this insight or vision in the artistic medium of film, in doing 
so, the films live simultaneously on two levels: a personal, or particular level, and a universal level, in 
that they show or intimate something of the foundations of the human condition. For example, in 
Brakhage’s epic, Dog Star Man (1961-1964), amidst the particularities of this woodcutter, this 
mountain, this seemingly insurmountable life-task, this particular struggle with dead wood, 
something of the universal emerges, and it might be expressed in terms of what Jaspers calls 
“fundamental situations,” existential-ontological situations that can only be acknowledged and 
confronted, never changed or surmounted. It is only in relation to these situations that human life 
holds the potential to become meaningful: 
 
We are always in situations. Situations change, opportunities arise. If they are missed they never return. I 
myself can work to change the situation. But there are situations which remain essentially the same even if 
their momentary aspect changes and their shattering force is obscured: I must die, I must suffer, I must 
struggle, I am subject to chance, I involve myself inexorably in guilt. We call these fundamental situations of 
our existence ultimate situations.    
 
The reconciliation of philosophy and art, which might be read as vengeance against Plato’s 
revenge on art, is something we prominently encounter in the German philosophical aesthetic 
tradition, e.g., in Schopenhauer, who argues the following: “Not merely philosophy but also the fine 
arts work at bottom towards solving the problem of existence.” Although they both share the same 
concern, namely, the search for meaning in human existence, the methodology and the manner in 
which they express their truths vary. Art is perceptual and philosophy is conceptual. This, according 
to Julian Young, is the manner in which analytic philosophy views the issue. However, as he points 
out, in the so-called “Continental” tradition, in somewhat crude and reductive terms, those 
philosophers more concerned with Kant’s aesthetics and morals than his epistemology, there is a 
blurring of the lines between philosophy and art in such a way that conceptual knowledge and 
aesthetic understanding hold the potential to co-exist. The knowledge that we glean from art, by 
means of the aesthetic experience, which I will outline, is neither reducible to propositional 
knowledge or calculative knowledge, nor is it wholly devoid of cognitive content. 
 
2. Vision and Knowledge in Philosophy and the Filmic Aesthetics of Brakhage 
 
While a detailed analysis and defense of cognitivism in aesthetics as related specifically to the avant-
garde is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a way in which to approach the issue of knowledge 
and art by examining what Brakhage states about the viewing of film. In the documentary Brakhage 
on Film (Gassan & Steegmiller, 1968), Brakhage likens the experience of watching film to that of 
participating in a religious “ritual.” In the writings of William James, on the variety of religious 
experiences, the “noetic,” or knowledge-giving, aspect of such psychological experiences is 
highlighted as one of several defining aspects of religious, or spiritual, possession. Heidegger, 
although renouncing the psychology of the event, as he thinks in terms of fundamental modes of 
attunement, in his now-famous (or infamous) interpretation of the Greek temple as monumental 
work of art, also draws out the inner workings of what might be termed a religious-aesthetic 
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experience for the Greeks who gathered at the great temple for worship, and who were, in an ec-
static moment of aesthetic attunement, within the “truth-happening” of the artwork, transformed, 
transfigured in a communal occurrence. Through an act of consecration inspired by the work of art, 
“the holy is opened up as holy and the god is invoked into the openness of his presence.” Below, 
Brakhage articulates the unique form of knowledge that he envisions as belonging to the domain of 
film-as-art. We might understand that the “pursuit” of this type of aesthetic knowledge is not 
limited to the filmmaker, and as well, is shared by the viewers of his films:  
 
I suggest, there is a pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and founded upon visual communication, 
demanding a development of the optical mind, and dependent upon perception in the original and deepest 
sense of the word. 
 
Two crucial points emerge from Brakhage’s statement as related to philosophy and the topic 
of aesthetic knowledge: First, the knowledge of which Brakhage speaks is analogous to the ancient 
Greek understanding of αἴσθησις (aisthēsis), which is present to philosophical discussions from the 
Pre-Socratics through Plotinus, and generally represents the simultaneous act of perception-cum-
intellection. It is a legitimate form of perceptual-emotional knowledge that is gleaned from works of 
art, and while it can be “poetized” – expressed through metaphor and symbol – it defies language in 
the sense that it differs in both form and content from empirical, axiomatic, and what we might 
term “propositional knowledge,” and is described as an immediate perceptual-noetic insight into 
whatever truth the artwork might inspire. Aesthetic knowledge, or understanding, is a legitimate 
form of world-disclosure, or movement into the truth as aletheuein (dis-closedness). Far from a 
difficult or spurious epistemological notion, this form of knowledge might be likened to what 
Nelson Goodman views as emotional-cognition, wherein our unique encounter with art adds to, 
deepens, and refines our understanding of the world in ways that would have been impossible 
without the encounter with the work of art. The artist, according to Goodman, “grasps fresh and 
significant relationships” through her immersion in the world, and then “devises means for making 
them manifest,” i.e., making them accessible to others within works of art, which function 
epistemologically in a unique manner.  
Secondly, Brakhage’s focus on “vision” and the understanding of what he terms the “optical 
mind,” were both notions intimately familiar to the ancient Greeks. As Jean Pierre-Vernant relates, 
vision had a privileged status for the Greeks, and unlike the Cartesian admonition to turn from the 
senses into the isolated, interior world of the subject founded on elementary truths gleaned by 
means of pure reason, in opposition to “things seen,” the Greeks viewed knowing as seeing, “to see 
and to know were one; if idein, ‘to see,’ and eidenai, ‘to know,’ are two verbal forms of the same term, 
eidos, ‘appearance, visible aspect,’ also means ‘the specific character, the intelligible form,’ this is 
because knowledge was interpreted and expressed through one’s  way of seeing.” Vision set the 
Greeks within the world in a way that defies ontological dualism. Prior to any discourse in modern 
philosophical circles, the ancient Greek was a Being-in-the-world in the most intimate, visceral, and 
primordial sense of this notion. “To see and live were one in the same,” as Vernant states, “and to 
be living, one had at the same time to see the light of the sun and to be visible to the eyes of all.” To 
leave the light of the sun signaled the loss of sight, the loss of knowledge, and the loss of Being, for 
to “leave and abandon the clarity of day was to delve into another world, that of Night.”  
This is certainly not to indicate that the Greeks accepted prima facie that which came to 
presence before them, in fact they were well aware that phenomena tend toward dissembling and 
concealment, but this is not to invalidate the claim that vision located them within an authentic 
epistemological and metaphysical relationship with the real world of their experience. However, 
Plato had a unique view of vision as it related to the real world, or realm of true Being, and this 
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emerges through the “non-naturalism” and “ontological dualism” of his philosophy, wherein 
existence is divided into two distinct realms: (1) the physical world, which is “visible” and accessible 
through sense perception, always changing and deceptive, and (2) the upper world of the forms 
(eidai), which are paradigms for the physical instantiation of entities. It is the case that for Plato, as 
he writes in the Phaedrus, the “bodily” (visual) experience of beauty captivates us through 
scintillating, sensuous appearance, and grants access to the immediacy of sensory appearances while 
simultaneously drawing us beyond the realm of the sensuous to the super-sensuous realm of the 
forms, where true Being resides at a remove from the lower realm of experience, which Plato 
literally classifies as me on, or “non-being.” In Plato, there is an acute attention to vision as it is 
bound up with the occurrence of an aesthetic experience, but ultimately its value lies in its ability to 
facilitate the movement away from the type of “embodied thinking” that great art inspires, away 
from the sensuous context of the lived world of our experience wherein the life-blood of art pulses. 
The sun for Plato, as described in the Republic, is the source of light, which represents the 
origin (arche) of vision, growth, and development, but it is not equated with any of these processes 
directly, and rather is a metaphor for the Form (eidos) of the Good, which is itself nothing 
experiential, but is the authentic source of goodness within the realm of the experiential. In other 
words, nothing would be capable of being defined as good in the sensate realm, if it did not 
participate in this Form, which is super-sensuous: “Light,” as Levinas reasons, “whether it emanates 
from the sensible or from the intelligible sun, is since Plato said to be a condition for all beings.” 
This represents the erroneous belief prevalent in our thought today, namely, the epistemological 
predisposition to associate light and its illumination with truth. In addition to Levinas, both 
Heidegger and Derrida are critical of this modern “Platonic-Cartesian,” which manifest in terms of 
the metaphysics of presence. As the logic runs, when things are revealed, they are brought into the 
clarifying light of truth, and when things are understood, they are “possessed,” as one might possess 
a present-at-hand object; they have been made manageable. “Light makes objects into a world,” writes 
Levinas, “that is, makes them belong to us.” Thus, there is a propensity for “truth” to be 
understood in the following manner: truth is viewed as a form of possession, or “ownership,” and 
truth is then wielded as a scepter for control and domination. Foucault reminds us that we must be 
cautious about approaching truth in this manner. For within the relationship between knowledge 
(truth) and power, power depends for its effectiveness on knowledge with respect to those claiming 
possession of it, and knowledge engenders and legitimizes power.  
 The films of Brakhage radically subvert this philosophical tendency ingrained in the modern 
consciousness, for as Camper indicates, Brakhage’s art flies in the face of “our tendency to limit 
ourselves to settling on a single way of thinking, a single way of seeing, a single set of objects 
defined or possessed.” For the illuminated images within his films, even when they are not abstract, 
are certainly not representational in the classical, traditional sense of the cinema. In most instances 
they are recalcitrant to any efforts to concretize them in terms of the understanding, e.g., the 
shimmering images that are brilliantly bathed in the direct, reflected, and refracted light in 
Commingled Containers (1998), evade our comprehension and tend toward dissembling and illusion, or 
what the Greeks called phantasia, which refers to the appearance of things by way of the senses that 
manifest as phantasma - apparitions and visions. Brakhage may well be taking the viewer on an 
imaginative journey, but he refuses to grant us access to a transcendent world beyond the films, a 
superior, paradigmatic world of Platonic super-sensuous truth, as if a “real” world beyond the 
immediate experience of the film existed. Brakhage also refuses to provide a vision of the world 
wherein it is rendered understandable, where it has been reified in knowledge. Brakhage’s films 
refuse to provide the viewer with what Camus calls “metaphysical solace,” which is to say, these 
films fail to satisfy “man’s unconscious feeling in the face of his universe, [his] insistence upon 
familiarity and appetite for clarity, that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute.” The 
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philosophical questions Brakhage asks, which give rise to the film in the first instance, always 
remain as questions, because he is asking original, or fundamental, questions, which are 
philosophical and of a dual-nature: they are transformative, they seek to reveal things that facilitate our 
development, and they at once inspire us toward the mode of preservation, they inspire the care and 
keeping of the basic question-worthy status of the things and issues his films address, such as love, 
existence, freedom, and human potential.  
   
3. The Return to Embodied Human Consciousness in the Films of Brakhage 
 
Prior to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who ushered in a way to radically re-think 
our “bodily” connection to the world (the “body-subject”), Nietzsche, who might be considered a 
proto-existentialist, fought against the traditional notion of the single, hypostatized “ego-subject” 
and was already carving out a prominent place for the body in philosophy after it had been exiled in 
favor of the power of reason (mind) to think true Being at a remove from the experiential realm – 
namely, he was attempting to overturn Platonism: In place of Plato and the “two worlds” of truth 
and seeming, he proposes one world, and in it he locates “the phenomenon of the body,” which for 
Nietzsche is far “more fundamental than belief in the soul,” because it is a “richer, clearer, more 
tangible phenomenon” than either the belief in the soul or in the power of so-called “detached 
thought” to accurately capture the depth and complexity of our existence. Brakhage, in his own 
radical manner, in an act of trans-valuating traditional cinematic values, sought to overturn the 
conventions of modern filmmaking, which included: first, rethinking the role of the spectator in 
terms of participant, for Brakhage’s films, as A. L. Reese points out, “make uncompromising 
demands on the viewer to elicit and construct meaning” because Brakhage shifts the “attention 
from the author’s voice to the spectator’s eye,” and secondly, retuning the senses of the cinemagoer 
by eliciting the “body,” in terms of consciousness as an “embodied phenomenon,” as the primary 
mode in which to experience his films, which included, most importantly, re-teaching us to see and 
feel again, as if for the first time. This is precisely what is called for in the mechanical age of reproduction, 
which might in part be inspired through sensitive art critique: the rediscovering and recovering of 
our senses and the meditative capacity of our Being as related to life and works of art.  
Brakhage succeeds in getting us to see and feel more, but this phenomenon is not reducible 
to the incorporation of non-representational shapes and images, as in films such as Purgation (1987) 
and Existence in Song (1987), which on the surface are abstract studies of color and light that 
challenge the eyes and the conscious sensibilities of those engaging the films. Brakhage also radically 
alters the cinematic experience of the spectator due to the unconventional manner in which 
physically wields the camera to produce the types of shots incorporated into such films as Desistfilm 
(1954), Anticipation of the Night (1958), and Dog Star Man. For example, in Desistfilm the camera not 
only shakes in an unsteady fashion, it jerks rapidly, yet with a sense of purpose and precision, from 
one subject to another in the interior shots of the intoxicated party. In Dog Star Man the camera 
whirls and spins in a manner that elicits an out-of-control, spiraling and dizzying effect, as Brakhage 
re-creates the woodcutter’s vision of the sky as viewed through the twisted, outstretched branches 
of the great trees that menacingly look down from above. In short, filming a movie for Brakhage 
was an intense, unadulterated bodily event, and often the result of hard and intensive physical labor 
on the part of the filmmaker. In the documentary Brackhage on Film, Brakhage is shown in the 
woods practicing various and quite radical techniques for filming with an empty camera, literally 
performing repetitive exercises in creative movement that closely resemble the beautiful and strange 
movements of modern dance, in order for these movements to become for him second-nature, as 
part of his organic bodily make-up. Listening to the interview, it becomes clear that for Brakhage, 
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filmmaking is as much about the bones and sinew – the blood and sweat - of the artist as it is the 
capacity and capability to “see” and visualize.     
In the documentary Brackhage (Shedden, 1999), we encounter an interview where the 
filmmaker actually reverses the polarity, the traditional relationship, between eye and camera, in that 
while it is the case that Brakhage’s camera, which produces the film, retunes the vision of the 
spectator who is taught to see anew, it might just as well be said that Brakhage is training the camera 
to see more like the human eye. He punctuates for both interviewer and cameraman the very way in 
which the classic “Hollywood” pan-shot, where the camera moves smoothly, effortlessly from one 
side to the other, located firmly on a tri-pod, is completely unnatural and antithetic to the way in 
which our eyes really take in the environment, and states emphatically, “The eyes can’t see that 
way.” Thus, as opposed to classic cinema, where in most cases the camera is most present when it is 
absent, or unobtrusive, in the films where Brakhage is not painting directly on the film-strips, there 
is a stark and bold obtrusive presence to the camera within the frames of the films, and as indicated 
above, it is a “living-camera” that shakes, trembles, and darts to and fro with a sense of autonomous 
conviction in order to transcend the mechanical, the cold technological remove of the machine, and 
return it to the “lived world” of the filmmaker, as a physical and emotional extension of the person 
holding the camera, who views herself and world, through it, and in turn invites the spectator to 
dwell in this world as if he or she is viewing the world directly through the filmmaker’s third organic 
eye.     
I think immediately of two such films that bespeak the situatedness of the human within the 
conscious world of its poetic making, as anchored within that world by the camera and overall 
“vision” of Brakhage, wherein its most primary mode of dwelling is undoubtedly linked to the 
optical organ, and they are Window Water Baby Moving (1959) and The Act of Seeing with One’s Own Eyes 
(1971), which is, as Camper relates, a “curious” and “creepy, study of the varieties of light reflected 
off of skin, with luminous fluids appearing to dance with the camera.” These films, when viewed 
one after the other, represent a powerful philosophical womb-to-tomb meditation on the human 
condition, with all of its ecstatic moments of joy, elation, and sublime wonder along with the 
concomitant horrors, fear of the unknown, and the realization of the fragile and ephemeral nature 
of human existence, all revealed though a vision within which we participate, and are granted 
privileged access to, only through the act of seeing qua seeing. There is a fusion of worlds taking 
place as we experience these films: Our “lived world” merges and participates in the visceral “lived 
world” of the film. We are in a quite literal sense present to the birth of the child, exploding with 
life and shimmering with liquid color, present in the morgue with all of its macabre, clinical 
sublimity, which is accentuated by the cold and calculating manner the medical examiner is probing, 
measuring, and examining the body prior to the incision. This film emanates a beautiful glowing 
reddish-orange hue in varying shades and tones, all of which transform the film into a 
contemporary “filmic” analogue to the grotesque, beautifully illumed paintings by Caravaggio, such 
as Judith Beheading Holofernes. 
The latter of these two films is intimately related to the ontology of death as we find in early 
Heidegger (Being and Time, 1927). Were we to remain in the cold, sterile atmosphere of the morgue, 
amidst the lifeless forms, we would identify death merely in biological terms, i.e., the cessation of 
the organs, thus viewing death in an inauthentic manner, as that phenomenon that happens to 
others, or as a quasi-established abstracted truth, which occurs at some distant point in the future. 
When understanding death in this manner, we are, according to Heidegger, “fleeing-in-the-face of 
death” in terms of its ontological magnitude. For Heidegger, it is the mood (Stimmung) of anxiety 
(Angst) that puts us, through a process of “existential individuation,” in touch with the ontological 
aspects of our Being, namely, our mortality. With Brakhage, it is possible to state that it is the 
aesthetic experience we have with his films that attunes us in such a way that we might be free for 
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the possibility of embracing death in terms other than the everyday understanding of it, wherein all 
of our possibilities are subordinated to the uttermost possibility of death, and thus become 
provisional in light of our finitude and mortality. In essence, when we embrace the ontological 
implications of death, there is an “anticipation” of death, an authentic comportment to death, which 
amounts to maintaining oneself within the imminent threat of death’s “indefinite certainty” at each 
and every moment of our existence. This ontological understanding hinges on the way that 
Brakhage’s film has framed the events for us, for while they contain the same content as would be 
consistent with a scientific documentary on autopsy, it is through the transfiguring lens of his filmic 
art that this world of the morgue is shown in philosophical terms wherein there is a play of and 
counter-striving between the “ontic” and “ontological,” i.e., life depicted on the “slab” is the bios, 
the finite individuated life of this person, which is set within the general ontological potential of all 
life is zoe, the invariant, general processes of life itself. 
Clearly this idea is present within modern existentialism and phenomenology, which 
generally unfolds through two phases: the phenomenological epoche (“bracketing”) and the eidetic 
reduction. Within this two-fold process the philosopher, in a preparatory moment, suspends her 
judgment with respect to the phenomenon under investigation, this allows for a whole range of 
unique and previously overlooked dimensions of experience to manifest. The phenomenological 
method allows us to see things through a reconfigured lens where epistemological and psychological 
categories are held in abeyance and things appear non-contingent and independent of our subjective 
categorizations for defining and understanding them. This reveals insight into the essential and 
invariant structures (ontological-existential) that give form to our existence. We see, as it were, in 
the particular manifestation of phenomena what is essential, or universal, to all phenomena of a 
similar type, e.g., this method would allow us to intuitively glean the existence of ultimate 
ontological situations, which are instantiated empirically, and within which we all find ourselves, 
such as those earlier introduced. This relates directly to what Camper writes about the process of 
readying oneself for the experience of Brakhage’s films, specifically the “openness” and 
“attentiveness” the viewer must cultivate in order to truly appreciate and benefit from the 
experience, and this includes the relaxed attitude of letting go of previously held conceptions, 
stripping oneself of prejudices about what film is or should be. Cleansing one’s conscious aesthetic 
palette, as it were, facilitates the mind-set required for the spectator to plumb “the depths of its 
imagery and the various themes and ideas suggested by its subject matter – imaginatively dancing 
with its flickering rhythms.” This process allows for the manifestation of things never before 
imagined, which initially involves a sense of giving, or releasing, oneself over to these films, and in a 
resolute manner, becoming open to new truths, indeterminate truths, that are on the approach in a 
unique way from the film.  
 
4. The Philosophical Experience of the Films: The Struggle for Self and World Amidst the 
Deafening Silence and Oppressive “Presence” of Impersonal Being   
 
In Brakhage on Film, the filmmaker states that he would prefer his 8mm films be experienced by the 
viewer in the comfort of her own home, wherein she can “live” with the images and meditate fully 
on them until they become familiar. In essence, the spectator creates the cinematic context within 
which the aesthetic experience occurs by reproducing the atmosphere of the cinema. This is 
precisely what Camper suggests that we must do when watching digital video reproductions of 
Brakhage’s original films. Much like Jean Goudal (“Surrealism and Cinema” 1925), who insists that 
the milieu of the darkened theatre is essential in recreating the dreamer’s habitat, crucial to the 
inspiration of that superior state of consciousness, surreality, Camper suggests a way in which to best 
“approximate the conditions of the cinema,” because in order to fully experience Brakhage’s work it 
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is “especially important not to view Brakhage films in the way most are accustomed to screening 
videos.” The atmosphere, he suggests, is one that is dark, intimate, and devoid of distractions, and 
for the silent films, I argue this is most crucial. Viewing a film by Brakhage is best approached 
within a space that, proximally and for the most part, privileges vision and hearing, a context that 
accentuates our vision and hearing, facilitating them into the acuity of their full power. For not only 
do our eyes need to be re-trained, but the screening of the films also provides an opportunity to re-
train our aural sensibilities: The silent films of Brakhage invite the return to our original ontological 
predisposition to “hear” – our originary auditory capacity that makes it possible to listen in 
anticipation of the truth of the art work, to listen, like the poet, for the call of the gods, to listen, as 
Heidegger insists, for the call of “conscience,” which awakens us to our authentic potential for 
Being.  
It is possible to draw an analogy between the “silence” of Brakhage’s films and the 
primordial “silence” of Being, which is something far more than merely the absence of sound. 
Below I reference Levinas’ description of the presence-in-absence of impersonal Being in terms of a 
“rumbling silence” as related Brakhage’s choice to screen many of his films in silence. The 
primordial silence of Being, states Levinas,  
 
is something resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness 
were full, as if the silence were a noise. It is something one can also feel when one thinks that even if there 
were nothing, the fact that “there is” is undeniable. 
 
This is precisely the experience of “noise” one hears and feels when viewing the silent films of 
Brakhage, and the aesthetic experience, along with the creation and enhancement thereof, is 
dependent in great part on the cinematic environment one has organized as described above. The 
incorporation of silence in Brakhage’s films is a crucial formal, stylistic, and aesthetic choice 
grounded in the quest to remain true to the purely visual aspect of film. In “The 60th Birthday 
Interview,” Suranjan Ganguly asks Brakhage what he learned from his relationships with both 
Varese and Cage, and Brakhage offers the following: “Primarily what I got from them was the 
inspiration to make silent film.” In the documentary Brakhage, filmmaker Phil Solomon speaks 
about the detrimental effect a sound track would have had on Brakhage’s films. “Brakhage,” states 
Solomon, “developed a sophisticated visual aesthetic based primarily on rhythm, and if one puts a 
soundtrack on, you face the possibility of being redundant.” The works, due to their visual rhythm 
created by the interplay of images and editing techniques, inspire a “mind’s eye soundtrack.” 
Solomon reasons that “if the major concern of film is mainly visual, then the reason sound is a 
blind alley is that it cuts back sight,” when film is silent, as Solomon suggests, “it becomes more 
possible to see.”  
And, as I suggest, what we see (hear) and experience when viewing a Brakhage film is the 
foreboding presence-in-absence of what Levinas’ identifies as the “There is,” or the ominous 
presence of impersonal Being. As opposed to the “dreamer’s milieu” of Surrealism, when 
experiencing a Brakhage film in the approximated conditions of the cinema, one is returned to a 
time before temporality, prior to the formation of the subject conceived in hypostatic terms, which 
might be poetized as a pre-linguistic world of Being prior to any and all beings, entities, and 
consciousness itself. Levinas, philosophizing the “There is” (il y a ), or the “existing without 
existents,” writes:  
 
“There is,” in general, without it mattering what there is, without our being able to fix a substantive to this 
term. “There is” is an impersonal form, like in it rains or it is warm. Its anonymity is essential. The mind does 
not find itself faced with an apprehended exterior […] The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what 
cannot disappear, the sheer fact of Being in which one participates, whether one wants to or not, without 
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having taken an initiative, anonymously. Being remains like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging 
to no one.  
 
It is possible to relate Levinas’ notion of impersonal Being in poetic, mythological terms to 
the great void of Chaos as conceived by the ancient Greeks. 
 
Chaos is an emptiness, a dark emptiness where nothing is visible. A realm of falling, of vertigo and confusion - 
endless, bottomless. That void seizes us like the yawning of an immense gullet where everything is swallowed 
up by murky darkness. So at the start there is only that Void, a blind, black, boundless abyss (Vernant).  
 
This “blind, black, boundless abyss” is as impenetrable as the darkness of night, and it is at 
night, during the darkest, blackest nocturnal hours that the “rumbling silence” of impersonal Being 
is most powerfully heard and felt in the midst of its deafening silence. For Levinas’ notion of the 
“There is” can be understood in terms of solitude and insomnia. In darkness we lack the power to 
“see” anything, but intuit the undeniable presence of “something” – we hear it, we feel it. The night, 
as Levinas claims, induces horror in the child who is relegated to the haunting solitude his room. 
When as a child, “one sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his 
bedroom as ‘rumbling’,” and in such moments the “I” is depersonalized, and this is also related to 
insomnia, for in this state of persistent wakefulness amid the night, “one can and one cannot say 
that there is a ‘I’ which cannot manage to fall asleep. The impossibility of escaping wakefulness is 
something ‘objective,’ independent of my initiative.” In this state I am absolutely dependent upon 
the night, or impersonal Being, in its persistence and threatening. Yet this dependence is something 
that cannot be transcended as long as we strive to give form to our conscious world as subjects, as a 
human beings, and accompanying this ontological truism is an overwhelming sense of horror and 
dread, for only in death is there an “absolute negation wherein ‘the music ends.” However, as 
Levinas reasons, outside of this single fatality, “one has the impression of a total impossibility of 
escaping it, of ‘stopping the music’.”  
The “There is” is indistinguishable from the sound of silence heard amidst the silence. It is, 
as Levinas states, the “absolute emptiness that one can imagine before creation,” and from out of 
this black abyss the subject as “I” emerges, which represents human existence in terms of the “the 
passage of going from being to a something.” In this process subjectivity, identity, and consciousness 
are de-centered, they are secondary to the primary condition of impersonal Being, which is always 
antecedent to human consciousness. This is why Levinas claims that prior to the “I am,” “There is,” 
and in thinking about what the passage from Being to being is like in relation to the films of 
Brakhage, we might imagine that life, the process of becoming an “existent,” is comprised of a 
succession of “liminal” moments, wherein human beings work to stand-out (ec-static) from the 
anonymous context of Being. In these liminal moments, we bring forth consciousness through the 
poetic act of creation when language, as a symbolic response to the void brings a world, a life, to 
stand-out in bold relief from the shapeless mass that forever encompasses our existence, from out 
of which our subject-hood emerges and threatens to return in death. Consciousness, for Levinas, is 
the hypostatic act of establishing an identity as separated off from the “There is,” and is, in many 
ways, the ephemeral attempt to escape Being. However, our human being, our subject-hood, is 
never given over by Being as a “gift,” it is “never inherited but always won in the heat of struggle,” 
clams Levinas. This struggle is the battle for a worldly existence, and it is at once the warring against 
the forces of impersonal Being and a personal battle in which we must assume the existential 
responsibility for choosing and laboring toward the end of becoming an existent. Levinas, unlike 
Heidegger, does not subscribe to the notion that we are thrown-into-the-world as Being-in-the-world, in 
terms of representing the primordial ontological notion that our Dasein is always already located in 
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the world. Rather, Levinas views our existence as a continued process of laboring in order belong to 
a world in the first instance, for the human is always at a “distance” from both Being and the world. 
In short, winning a life, finding a home within the world amounts to engaging in a struggle with 
primordial forces that are indifferent to our condition: Life is “labor.”        
It is possible to imagine such a life as described being portrayed, or better, captured as lived 
by the filmmaker: The films of Brakhage document, as consecrated acts of subjectivity, the arduous 
process of resisting impersonal Being, wracked as it is with horror and dangers, by ceaselessly 
struggling to wrest our being, our conscious existence and world from unconcealment: We strive to 
give form and shape to our world, we work to define, redefine, and reconfigure our conscious 
existence while Being threatens at every turn to overwhelm even our most valiant efforts and engulf 
our consciousness, returning us to the black, shapeless void from whence we have struggled to 
emerge. Brakhage is not so much attempting to fully understanding Being, rather he is re-presenting 
the condition within which we find ourselves, i.e., he is not primarily concerned with “what” Being 
is, rather “that” it is, as a brute fact, and the richness in his work streams from his quest to examine 
through film the processes of “how” we become truly as human beings, how and to what degree we 
are able to shoulder the weight of the responsibility that presses down upon us for making a life.  
As articulated, life might be equated with the attempt to escape impersonal Being, and 
works of art, poetic acts of creation, state building, nation building are all testimonies to human 
consciousness attempting to resist Being, to stand out again the shapeless backdrop of the void of 
Being. These are all labor-intensive acts, which acquire meaning in the personal struggle against the 
ontological forces that are beyond us, and since we can never assimilate Being in knowledge it 
remains external, it is never made a possession. It is not difficult to see this theme played out in Dog 
Star Man, for it is possible to read the film is a testament to our laboring to establish a world in the 
face of Being wherein we experience the onset and onslaught of fatigue, the impending drive to halt 
or escape from the weight of our “world building” activities. In moments of fatigue we seek to 
refuel and re-motivate, to somehow regain a semblance of strength to resist the urge to abandon the 
task and continue on in the ominous presence of the overwhelming weight of impersonal Being. 
For example, the woodcutter must always be reminded of his commitment to the task, and this 
comes through the experience of fatigue, wherein he is at once confronted by the unarticulated, 
implicit existential responsibility and necessity to carry on up the mountain and the concomitant 
desire to abandon the labor under the sheer weight of the task.  
Brakhage, with deft sensitivity and imagination, re-produces the difference between Being 
and beings in the films Stellar (1993), Study in Color and Black and White (1993), and Black Ice (1994), 
for these films, while one might refer to them as light and color studies, are more aptly conceived in 
terms of the glaring absence of light, these films are dominated by the intrusion of Chaos and night 
on the subject’s conscious efforts to establish a terrestrial grounding amidst the groundless chasm 
of Being. Brakhage remarks about Stellar that it is “a visual envisioning of outer space,” and the void 
plays a dominant role in this film, for while brilliant, fleeting flashes of luminescent celestial forms 
emerge, are born, in a variety of brilliant hues, they just as quickly “burn out” as they are 
extinguished and consumed by the abyss from out of which they arose. Black Ice is also a short film 
wherein light and color are threatened to be overtaken by the black of night, and the zooming effect 
produces the feeling in the spectator, not so much that the film is rushing toward her, but rather 
that she is falling into the realm of impersonal Being, “the realm of falling, of vertigo and 
confusion,” as described by Vernant, and loosing both her footing on the shifting foundations of 
her world along with her grip on consciousness amidst the onslaught of Being. Both of these films 
might be read as reminders that the formation of subject-hood is an act that always teeters on the 
brink of disaster, for the danger is ever-present that the “void seizes us like the yawning of an 
immense gullet where everything is swallowed up by murky darkness.”  
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Perhaps the film that most eloquently poetizes the overwhelming power, weight, and 
presence of the void of Being is Study in Color and Black and White. The dominance of black in the 
frames obtrusively plays a crucial role thematically and not just visually, for not only does it function 
as a stark contrast to the brightly lit shapes, setting the vibrant colors aglow, it also gives the tactile 
sense that darkness, night, impersonal Being threatens every second of the film to envelope and 
eclipse the light once and for all. This indicates that our existence, much like the films of Brakhage, 
as Levinas writes, unfolds in the “dread before Being,” in terms of “an impotent recoil, an evasion” 
from the haunting “shadow of the “There is.’” In line with this theme, Brakhage ingeniously 
incorporates the use of what I term the “cinematic caesura,” as in the films Existence as Song and The 
Dante Quartet (1987), which as opposed to merely representing, through the incorporation of several 
pure black frames, a pause delineating a rhythmic division in the films, as related to what has been 
stated about Levinas, Brakhage has them function in an ontological manner, reminding the 
spectator of the precarious nature of our being and our constant dependence on and the intractable 
relationship with the primordial void of Being that is inescapable. For the radical contrast Brakhage 
sets up between light and dark, between radiant color and black, or the complete absence of light, 
functions beyond a mere technique related to aesthetic composition. When describing the films I 
have chosen to analyze, one might well replace the phrase, “interplay of light and dark within a 
context of symmetrical and asymmetrical juxtaposition,” with the observation that their interaction 
is violent and resembles, more often than not, a life and death struggle for superiority, which 
threatens to break beyond the horizon of film’s frame. 
 To aptly conclude reflections on this theme I examine Eye Myth (1967),  a hand-painted and 
etched (scratched) short film that grows out of the above philosophical notion of the “There is,” 
i.e., that we are, from the moment we are conscious, precariously poised on the precipice of 
relinquishing our consciousness to the forces of night, of Being. This film portrays a man, 
immersed inextricably within the struggle with Being amidst the brute onslaught of sensory stimuli. 
Brakhage brilliantly recreates the phenomenon through the furious activity of light and color raining 
down on the protagonist, as if to assault him, as he desperately labors to give form and meaning to 
his world in a fleeting, and heroic, attempt to stand-out from the shapeless chasm of the “There is.” 
As the film poetizes, our lives are a continued, ever-renewed process of wresting beings from 
concealment, with the concomitant understanding that those things brought to the light of truth 
always hold the propensity to sink back into the black void of impersonal Being. In the span of 9-
seconds, Brakhage manages to philosophically poetize the protagonist’s ontological condemnation 
to life in terms of the continued process of self-formation, deformation, and reformation, all the 
while haunted by the foreboding sense of danger of primordial darkness that threatens to intrude 
into all human endeavors, when our fleeting moments of existential clarity are thrown into 
confusion and we are overwhelmed by the shear force of the oblivion. The films I have analyzed in 
the final section all re-produce the human life-task in terms of the perennial passage from Being to 
something, from Being to being. Brakhage’s films capture the extreme uncertainty bound up with this 
life-task, with its propensity toward disaster and abject failure, which are experienced in moments 
when we are horrified and humbled before the sublime weight and mystery of Being.    
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
Camper outlines the thrust of Brakhage’s filmmaking in the following terms:  
 
[H]is project was always to explore the richness of seeing and of life in its totality, accepting no 
givens about what seeing, or the film image, or life itself is, but always pushing toward the unknown 
[…] his films are made with an intensity, a kind of ‘wits end’ desperation, that suggests a 
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consciousness on the brink. Brakage was not only a craftsman doing something he loved; he used 
his craft to try to come to an understanding of whether – and on what terms – he could continue to 
go on living. 
 
This, as I have attempted to show, was Brakhage’s pursuit of art rooted in legitimate 
philosophical inquiry, which dealt with philosophical issues through the medium of filmic 
aesthetics. A great many of his films, perhaps his art in general, emerges from traumatic events, a 
fall on a patch of black ice that left him blind for a short period of time, persistent and grave 
illnesses, oppressive thoughts on suicide. This, of course, is the perennial question of philosophy as 
modified by Camus in the Myth of Sysiphus: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, 
and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the 
fundamental question of philosophy.” In a universe that is devoid of intrinsic meaning, in a world 
that continually resists our best efforts to understand it or justify it in religious, scientific, or moral 
terms, Brakhage’s films testify, in a manner reminiscent of Nietzsche, that it is perhaps only as an 
“aesthetic phenomenon” that the world might be made meaningful – and Brakhage found his world 
intensely meaningful. 
The human is a complex. However, as Heidegger states, “Philosophy need not be high 
flown, it is enough to dwell on what lies close and immediate in the here and now.” Anyone can 
follow the path of meditative thought, thinking in her own way, within her own limits, and as 
Camper observes, through his films Brakhage wanted to make us aware that “each of us can 
become an inner explorer, continually pushing toward some new frontier of consciousness.” I have 
always viewed philosophy as a form of creative problem solving, but perhaps a better definition 
would refer philosophy to a form of thinking that is never truly at an end, never completed. While 
its scope is grand and its issues many and varied, philosophy most often finds its subject matter, its 
place and home-ground, within the immediate realm of our day-to-day lives. Much like Brakhage, it 
is possible to think seriously and philosophically about such things as this patch of earth, this 
present time in history, this life with family and friends, and all of these things, it might be said, 
viewed through the eyes and lens of the filmmaker, served as his artistic inspiration, which rooted 
him philosophically in the world.  
Brakhage’s films show us something important and often overlooked about philosophy: We 
often consider philosophy a discipline that seeks to solve the problems of existence, and what is 
glossed in this understanding is that prior to any move to solve problems, philosophy must first 
seek a proper understanding of the issues, which often entails a reformulation of the initial 
questions that we ask, which amounts to an inquiry into the questions themselves, in order to clarify 
the manner in which to best approach the problems in the first instance. If the films of Brakhage 
are philosophical questions in celluloid, as I have attempted to show, then they denote the on-the-
wayness of philosophy, the incompleteness of all philosophical thought. However, this is not a 
weakness in or critique of philosophy, this simply demonstrates the intractable nature of the things 
philosophy deals with, and one can view this as problematic or, as did Brakhage, through the 
attunement of “wonder” (thauma), wherein the world is revealed in such a way that our existence, 
although never fully explained or justified, shot through as it is with a preponderance of profuse 
and intense pain and suffering, also holds the “possibility of deep satisfaction and indeed, in exalted 
moments, of perfection.” Brakhage’s films undoubtedly give us many of these co-called “exalted 
moments of perfection,” and to apprehend this reality, with the courage, sensitivity, and aesthetic 
acuity of Brakhage, amounts to grasping what Jaspers calls the “the aim of the philosophical 
endeavor.”    
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